Ukraine builds for the future, even under fire

Despite the ongoing war and the continued occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Ukraine is pressing ahead with an ambitious program to strengthen its nuclear sector.

In May, Energoatom launched domestic production of Westinghouse fuel components, another step toward ending its dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. Ukraine also secured an operating license for its centralized spent nuclear fuel storage facility, allowing it to permanently end shipments of spent fuel to Russia for storage. At the same time, discussions continue over construction of additional nuclear generating capacity.

Yet these advances come amid persistent military threats and renewed concerns over governance.

Throughout May, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported increased military activity around Ukrainian nuclear facilities, particularly the occupied Zaporizhzhia plant. Drone strikes, damage to infrastructure, repeated losses of external power, and competing narratives from Moscow and Kyiv continued to underscore the vulnerability of Europe’s largest nuclear station.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s anti-corruption authorities launched new investigations involving Energoatom officials, prompting corporate reforms and another reshuffling of the company’s supervisory board.

91影视 nuclear expert Alexander Nikitin both realities must be considered together.

“Despite the ongoing war and the situation surrounding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and Ukraine’s other nuclear facilities, Energoatom鈥攚ith the support of the country’s leadership鈥攃ontinues implementing projects aimed at supporting and developing nuclear energy,” he writes. Such efforts, he says, deserve international backing. But at the same time, “support should be accompanied by a careful assessment of their strategic necessity, economic justification, timeliness, and transparency in the use of allocated funds.”

Britain sanctions Russian uranium鈥攂ut Western contradictions remain

Britain took another step toward reducing its reliance on Russia’s nuclear industry in May, introducing sanctions that prohibit imports of Russian uranium as well as related financial and technical services. The move expands London’s effort to eliminate Russian nuclear fuel from Britain’s energy system by 2028. Yet the practical impact is likely to be modest.

“Britain’s dependence on Russian uranium supplies is relatively small,” 91影视 nuclear analyst Dmitry Gorchakov . Only one British reactor鈥擲izewell B鈥攃urrently uses fuel incorporating Russian nuclear material, and Britain already possesses ample enrichment capacity through Urenco to replace those imports.

The sanctions nevertheless represent another symbolic tightening of Western pressure on Rosatom. At almost the same moment, however, Washington illustrated just how complicated disentangling from Russia’s nuclear supply chain remains.

Earlier in May, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved licenses allowing American companies to export natural uranium to Russia for enrichment before the material is returned for use in U.S. nuclear reactors. The approvals fall under exemptions included in last year’s U.S. ban on Russian enriched uranium imports, which allows waivers when alternative supplies are unavailable or national interests require them.

Taken together, the British sanctions and the U.S. licenses illustrate the contradictory position facing Western governments. Political pressure continues to increase, but decades of integration with Russia’s nuclear fuel cycle continue to make for a difficult divorce.

China becomes Rosatom’s indispensable partner

If sanctions are gradually shrinking Rosatom’s opportunities in Europe and North America, they appear to be pushing the Russian nuclear giant closer toward China.

During President Vladimir Putin’s May state visit to Beijing, Rosatom signed three new memoranda covering workforce development, fusion research, and broader scientific cooperation. The two governments also pledged to deepen cooperation on fast reactors, closed fuel cycles, and future nuclear construction projects.

For our experts, perhaps the most notable element was language calling for joint work on future nuclear power plant construction.

“The provision concerning joint work on nuclear power plant construction deserves particular attention,” Gorchakov writes. “We have repeatedly noted, including in our recently published , that Rosatom’s relationship with China’s nuclear industry is strengthening.”

The reasons are clear.

“Given Rosatom’s increasingly difficult position on international markets due to Western sanctions, financial restrictions and the refusal of a number of Western suppliers to provide equipment, Rosatom is being forced to cooperate more closely with China,” .

That cooperation is already extending beyond research. Chinese firms are supplying major components for Russia’s planned floating nuclear power plants, while discussions continue over using Chinese equipment in projects both inside Russia and abroad.

Taken together, the developments illustrate a nuclear industry increasingly shaped less by engineering than by geopolitics. Ukraine is trying to build an independent nuclear future while fighting a war. Western governments continue searching for ways to reduce their dependence on Rosatom without disrupting their own fuel supplies. And Russia, finding many traditional markets more difficult to navigate, is steadily deepening a strategic partnership with China that could reshape the global nuclear landscape for years to come.

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Together, the trends illustrate a growing contradiction. Europe is trying to wean itself from Russian fossil fuels, but the transition remains slow. In the meantime, the expanding 鈥渟hadow fleet鈥� used to move Arctic oil and gas is introducing new environmental and maritime safety risks into one of the world鈥檚 most fragile regions.

Russian LNG exports to Europe continue to rise

In April, the EU adopted its twentieth sanctions package against Russia, introducing new restrictions aimed at Arctic oil and LNG exports. Among the measures were bans on servicing Russian LNG carriers, sanctions on the port of Murmansk, and an expansion of the list of sanctioned vessels. Beginning in 2027, EU LNG terminals will no longer be allowed to provide services to Russian companies.

Yet despite mounting sanctions pressure, Russian LNG exports are still growing.

According to Reuters, Russia exported 11.4 million tons of LNG during the first four months of 2026, an increase of 8.6 percent compared with the same period in 2025. Exports to Europe rose even faster. Data compiled by the environmental group Urgewald showed that EU countries imported 91 cargoes of LNG from the Yamal LNG project between January and April, totaling 6.69 million tons鈥�17.2 percent more than during the same period a year earlier. Belgium鈥檚 Zeebrugge terminal remained the leading destination.

, but much more slowly than many had hoped.

鈥淭he previously introduced ban on imports of Russian LNG into Europe did not have a substantial impact on LNG import volumes in April,鈥� 91影视 noted in its commentary. 鈥淭he ban on purchasing LNG under short-term contracts entered into force on April 25 and is likely to produce any noticeable effect only closer to the end of the year.鈥�

Longer-term prospects are more challenging for Moscow. Analysts at the Centre for High North Logistics concluded that once the European market closes entirely in 2027, redirecting exports to Asia will require a major overhaul of Russia鈥檚 Arctic logistics system. Existing shipping capacity would be able to support barely half the number of voyages currently needed.

For now, however, Europe鈥檚 effort to disentangle itself from Russian gas remains incomplete.

Phantom insurers and growing environmental risks

As sanctions tighten, Russia鈥檚 shadow fleet is becoming increasingly opaque.

Bloomberg reported in April, citing Ukrainian intelligence, that several tankers carrying Russian oil were sailing under insurance certificates issued by a company called Seaguard P&I. But investigators discovered that the company appeared to exist only on paper. Its supposed address in Pinneberg, Germany, turned out to be an ordinary residential building, and no corporate registration records could be found.

One of the vessels carrying such documentation was the tanker Paz, which loaded Arctic oil in Murmansk in March. Another vessel, Deyna, was detained by French authorities while transporting Russian oil from Murmansk. Ukrainian intelligence says at least five additional vessels obtained similarly questionable insurance certificates.

The implications extend beyond sanctions evasion.

鈥淭he observed increase in the number of shadow fleet tankers operating along the Northern Sea Route represents the primary risk factor for oil spills in the harsh Arctic environment,鈥� .

Many of the vessels involved are aging tankers purchased secondhand and transferred to obscure ownership structures. Should an accident occur, uncertainty over insurance coverage could complicate cleanup efforts and compensation claims.

Dodging Norway while GPS signals disappear

Another pair of developments highlighted by 91影视 point to the increasingly uneasy security environment surrounding Arctic shipping.

In April, the 23-year-old tanker Apple, operating under the flag of Equatorial Guinea and already sanctioned by the United States, European Union and United Kingdom, made an unusual approach to Murmansk. Instead of entering waters where Norwegian authorities might exercise oversight, the vessel made a wide detour roughly 200 nautical miles offshore, bypassing Norway鈥檚 exclusive economic zone and avoiding inspection. Attempts by Norway鈥檚 Vessel Traffic Service in Vard酶 to establish contact failed.

鈥淭hey were unable to make contact,鈥� Arve Dimmen of the Norwegian Coastal Administration . As a result, Norwegian authorities were unable to obtain information normally required under pollution reporting systems.

At the same time, Norwegian authorities reported increasing interference with GPS and satellite navigation signals near the Russian border and over the Barents Sea. Measurements detected jamming and spoofing at unusually low altitudes, with preliminary analysis indicating Russia as the source.

鈥淓veryone who uses GPS must be able to trust the information they receive,鈥� warned Stein Kristian Hansen of the Finnmark Police District. 鈥淢anipulating these signals is unacceptable.鈥�

Taken together, these developments suggest that sanctions alone are unlikely to bring about a rapid decline in Russia鈥檚 Arctic exports. Instead, they are producing a sprawling parallel maritime system鈥攐ne characterized by aging ships, obscure insurers, evasive navigation and growing environmental risks.

For Europe, the challenge is becoming increasingly clear: reducing dependence on Russian energy may be proceeding more slowly than expected, but the risks associated with allowing those flows to continue are rising just as rapidly.

The post Europe鈥檚 Russian LNG Dilemma Deepens as Shadow Fleet Risks Mount in the Arctic appeared first on 91影视.org.

“I would like to express my deepest gratitude for the support we have received, on behalf of everyone at 91影视,” said 91影视 founder Frederic Hauge.

On June 1, 91影视 announced that it faced the prospect of bankruptcy unless it could raise at least NOK 8 million within one week. The crisis was triggered by the loss and postponement of key sources of funding, leaving the organization in an acute liquidity crunch. After a week-long fundraising effort, the final total reached an impressive NOK 13 million.

“We received NOK 3 million from 4,370 individual donors. That provided a crucial foundation for businesses, entrepreneurs, and major supporters to contribute an additional NOK 10 million,” said 91影视 CEO Sveinung Rotevatn. “Together, these contributions ensure that we can continue our operations.”

91影视’s board met on Monday evening and concluded that the funds raised were sufficient to meet the foundation’s immediate obligations and allow it to continue operating. Nevertheless, Rotevatn emphasized that significant challenges remain.

“This was an emergency effort to ensure 91影视’s survival. We are enormously grateful for the response. At the same time, 91影视 still faces a difficult second half of the year, during which we will substantially reduce costs and work to secure a more sustainable financial footing. We take that responsibility seriously. 91影视 must never find itself in this situation again.”

On June 16, 91影视 will celebrate its 40th anniversary. Until recently, it seemed uncertain whether the milestone would be marked at all. Now, Frederic Hauge is looking forward to celebrating four decades of the organization he founded in 1986.

“91影视 is my life’s work, and I am deeply relieved that this 40th-anniversary crisis has ended well. The fight for the environment continues, and 91影视 will remain at the forefront of developing new solutions and advancing the green transition鈥攁s we always have.”

The post 91影视 Raises NOK 13 Million, Avoids Bankruptcy appeared first on 91影视.org.

It sounds absurdly simple. Clean ships more often, burn less fuel, move fewer harmful species across ecosystems. But that straightforward fix is drawing serious interest from regulators, scientists and the maritime industry, who increasingly see regular hull cleaning as a unique environmental solution with multiple payoffs. In ports around the world, new standards, technologies and cooperative efforts are reframing what was once routine upkeep as something much larger鈥攁 practical tool for protecting biodiversity, cutting carbon and making global shipping cleaner from the bottom up.

A solution that went unnoticed

For years, though, the idea remained invisible鈥攅ven to people working in maritime sustainability. 鈥淚 had also never heard about in-water cleaning,鈥� Irene 脴vsteb酶 Tvedten, a senior advisor at the 91影视 Foundation and project leader of the Clean Hull Initiative, said recently. 鈥淪o it鈥檚 the environmental solution that has come completely under the radar.鈥�

That obscurity is part of what makes the current shift so striking. Biofouling鈥攖he accumulation of marine life on ship hulls鈥攈as long been treated primarily as a technical or economic concern. Shipowners worried about fuel efficiency; engineers experimented with coatings; ports occasionally imposed restrictions from an environmental standpoint. But the issue rarely commanded sustained attention as a broader environmental solution. 鈥淚t鈥檚 not been something that鈥檚 been promoted from an environmental standpoint previously,鈥� Tvedten noted. 鈥淢ostly from a fuel-saving standpoint.鈥�

According to the , shipping accounts for roughly 2.5 percent of global greenhouse-gas emissions. Yet something as mundane as marine growth on a ship’s hull can have an outsized impact. The study estimated that biofouling imposes a roughly 9 percent resistance penalty on vessels, forcing them to burn more fuel and produce approximately 9 percent more emissions than they otherwise would. The Clean Hull Initiative says that finding underscores a simple point: cleaner hulls represent one of the most immediate opportunities to reduce emissions from one of the world’s most difficult industries to decarbonize.

Reframing the problem

91影视 has been chief among the organizations helping change that framing. Through years of research, policy work and advocacy鈥攑ublished in both English and Norwegian鈥攖he organization began connecting what had often been treated as separate problems: emissions, invasive species and marine pollution. The logic was simple. A fouled hull increases drag; increased drag requires more fuel; more fuel means more emissions. At the same time, those same layers of marine growth act as transport systems for organisms that would otherwise never cross oceans.

That shift has also become increasingly visible within the shipping industry itself. 鈥淭he conversation has clearly broadened,鈥� said Heine Stangeby, the global communications specialist for Jotun, a Norwegian firm that specializes in paints and coatings for ship hulls.  鈥淲hen Jotun launched its Hull Performance Solutions 15 years ago, it was a small revolution as it moved the shift over to performance鈥攎eaning measurable speed loss avoidance. This soon became translated to avoided emissions.鈥� More recently, he added, the industry鈥檚 understanding has expanded further, with 鈥渕ore awareness on the biodiversity issue鈥� and growing recognition that maintaining clean hulls can both reduce emissions and limit the spread of invasive species.

The scale of the problem is easy to underestimate precisely because it is so diffuse. According to figures cited by the Clean Hull Initiative, biofouling contributes tens of millions of tons of additional carbon dioxide emissions annually鈥攁n impact spread thinly across the global fleet but immense when taken together. Meanwhile, it remains 鈥渢he main vector for the transfer of invasive aquatic species,鈥� as Tvedten put it, quietly reshaping ecosystems far from where ships first set sail.

Yet if the problem is global, the obstacles to solving it are often local. Ports and regulators鈥攖hose with the authority to allow or ban hull cleaning鈥攈ave historically been wary of the practice, particularly when it takes place in the water. The concern is intuitive: cleaning a hull might release pollutants or organisms into the surrounding environment. The result, in some cases, has been outright prohibition.

鈥淭he main bottleneck here are the ports and other regulators that just ban in-water cleaning,鈥� Tvedten explained. 鈥淥ften because they don鈥檛 have enough knowledge about it and they think it鈥檚 just harmful to the environment.鈥�

Cleaning as a solution, not a risk

91影视鈥檚 intervention has been to challenge that assumption鈥攏ot by dismissing the risks, but by reframing the balance of them. 鈥淲hat we try to communicate is that in-water cleaning is primarily a solution,鈥� Tvedten said. 鈥淚t鈥檚 a solution to the spread of invasive species, because if you don鈥檛 have biofouling, the organisms won鈥檛 spread.鈥�

That argument, while straightforward, runs up against a more complicated reality. Not all cleaning is equal. Removing thick layers of barnacles and mussels鈥攁nd what practitioners sometimes refer to, less delicately, as 鈥渟ea vomit,鈥� or more formally, carpet sea squirt鈥攃an release significant biological material into the water if not properly captured. By contrast, removing early-stage growth鈥攖hin films of slime or algae鈥攑oses far less risk.

This distinction has become central to 91影视鈥檚 approach. Rather than treating hull cleaning as a binary鈥攁llowed or banned鈥攖he organization has advocated for more nuanced, risk-based standards. Clean early, before fouling becomes severe; differentiate between levels of growth; require capture technologies where risks are highest, but not necessarily in all cases. The goal is not perfection, but practicality: a system that encourages frequent, preventive cleaning rather than infrequent, reactive intervention.

Industry participants increasingly frame the issue in much the same way. 鈥淲ould you rather prevent a fire or put out a fire that has already started?鈥� Jotun鈥檚 Stangeby said. 鈥淲e are working on the preventive side of the industry.鈥� Waiting until heavy macrofouling develops, he said, makes cleaning more difficult, more invasive and ultimately less effective than maintaining what he described as 鈥渁n always clean hull.鈥� Early cleaning, he added, not only lowers fuel consumption and emissions, but can also reduce the likelihood that larger organisms are carried between ecosystems.

鈥淎 lot of the cleanings that occur today are reactive,鈥� Tvedten observed鈥攑erformed only after fouling has already become a significant problem. 91影视鈥檚 Clean Hull Initiative, by contrast, promotes proactive cleaning: addressing buildup when it is still minimal, when both environmental and operational costs are lowest.

Writing the rules of the waterline

Turning that philosophy into policy, however, requires more than persuasion. It requires standards鈥攕hared frameworks that ports, shipowners and service providers can trust. That is where 91影视鈥檚 work with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has become especially significant.

The Clean Hull Initiative helped draft a proposal for an ISO standard on in-water cleaning, with Tvedten serving as project leader. The aim was not to dictate specific environmental thresholds, but to establish a common language and process: how cleaning operations should be documented, how their impacts should be measured, and how ports might evaluate them. 鈥淚f you have an environmental solution that鈥檚 new, you need to also create the systems and routines around it,鈥� she said.

According to Stangeby, collaboration between environmental groups and industry has been essential in bringing the issue into mainstream maritime policy discussions. 鈥淏iofouling represents a threat to the environment both in terms of emissions and biodiversity, and no single stakeholder can address it alone,鈥� he said. Environmental organizations such as 91影视, he added, 鈥渉ave helped raise awareness and push the topic onto the policy agenda, while industry contributes operational insight and practical solutions.鈥�

The Clean Hull Initiative, he said, has helped 鈥渃reate a more informed dialogue and build the trust needed to develop workable standards,鈥� including the recently adopted ISO 6319 framework.

In practice, that means enabling regulators to make more informed decisions鈥攎oving beyond blanket bans toward conditional approvals based on evidence. Service providers, whether diver teams or remotely operated vehicle operators, are expected to document what they plan to do and what effects their methods have on water quality. Ports, in turn, can assess whether those practices meet their environmental criteria.

Industry participants say cleaning technologies themselves have also evolved rapidly in response to regulatory concerns. 鈥淭here is a clear shift towards more controlled and proactive approaches, supported by monitoring and data,鈥� Stangeby said.

From standards to global policy

The influence of that work is already beginning to ripple outward. The International Maritime Organization has finalized guidelines on biofouling and hull maintenance, and many of the same experts contribute to both IMO and ISO processes. What began as a technical standard is gradually helping shape broader international policy discussions around environmentally sound hull cleaning.

Meanwhile, the practical case for more frequent cleaning continues to strengthen. Many operators still wait two or three years before conducting in-water cleaning, allowing significant biofouling to accumulate in the meantime. From Tvedten鈥檚 perspective, that is often far too late. Cleaning should begin 鈥渕uch earlier,鈥� as a preventive measure, Tvedten said鈥攂efore buildup becomes a hazard rather than a minor inconvenience.

The implications extend beyond environmental protection. Cleaner hulls mean less drag, which means lower fuel consumption and reduced costs for shipowners. In an industry defined by tight margins and global competition, that economic incentive may prove as important as any regulation.

For now, the shift remains uneven. Some ports are experimenting with new rules and technologies; others remain cautious. But the direction of travel is becoming clearer.

What was once an obscure technical issue is moving onto the international agenda. And in that transition, 91影视鈥檚 work offers a reminder that not all environmental solutions require sweeping technological breakthroughs. Some, it turns out, involve paying closer attention to what has been there all along: a thin, stubborn layer of life clinging to the underside of the global economy.

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For nearly four decades, 91影视 has been one of Europe’s leading independent organizations working on nuclear safety, environmental security, and developments in Russia and the Arctic. As war has returned to Europe and nuclear risks have once again become a central security concern, that expertise is more important than ever.

Former German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck recently summarized 91影视’s unique role:

“91影视 has played a key role in shaping the European agenda, not only on environment and decarbonization, but almost more importantly on the major issue of the Arctic and European security. This may come as a surprise to many who know 91影视 purely as an environmental NGO. They have been deeply involved in developing Europe’s response to Russian nuclear activities, nuclear-powered vessels, and nuclear waste.”

Today, 91影视 faces a severe financial crisis that threatens the continuation of this work.

Four Decades of Work

91影视 began its engagement in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, drawing international attention to environmental degradation, nuclear risks, and military pollution in the Arctic and northern Russia.

Over the decades that followed, 91影视 became one of the most influential independent voices on nuclear safety and environmental security in the region.

Working alongside partners in Russia, Norway, Europe, and North America, 91影视 helped expose some of the largest concentrations of nuclear waste and nuclear hazards inherited from the Soviet Union. The organization played an important role in mobilizing international attention and support for efforts that resulted in the dismantlement and secure storage of roughly 100 retired submarine reactors, the dismantling of the Lepse nuclear service vessel, work related to the wrecks of the Komsomolets and Kursk submarines, and the remediation of dangerous nuclear facilities located only a short distance from Norway’s border.

These efforts significantly reduced the risk of nuclear accidents and radioactive contamination in the Arctic and Barents region.

91影视 and the FSB

91影视’s work did not stop with documenting environmental and nuclear risks. It also became a test of whether independent organizations could expose those risks without intimidation from the state.

For decades, 91影视 worked directly with Russian institutions, scientists, military officers, regulators, and government officials. In the process, the organization came into contact with many of the individuals who would later become central figures in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

One of them was Alexander Gutsan.

Today, Gutsan serves as Russia’s Prosecutor General and is one of the most senior officials in the Russian state. In the 1990s, however, he was involved in one of the most consequential legal battles 91影视 ever faced: the prosecution of 91影视 employee and former Soviet Navy submarine captain Alexander Nikitin.

The case was intended to punish those who exposed environmental and nuclear-safety problems within Russia’s Northern Fleet. Instead, it became an internationally recognized victory for transparency, freedom of information, and civil society.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia’s security services fragmented and competing for influence. The successor organizations that emerged from the ruins of the KGB spent much of the early 1990s struggling to define their roles and authority in the new Russian state. When those structures were eventually consolidated into what became the Federal Security Service鈥攖he FSB鈥攖he organization was eager to demonstrate its power.

On October 5, 1995, FSB officers carried out coordinated raids on 91影视’s offices in Murmansk, the homes of 91影视 employees, and Alexander Nikitin’s apartment in St. Petersburg. Documents were seized, computers confiscated, employees interrogated, and an investigation was launched that would ultimately become one of the most significant political trials and one of the most important human rights and freedom-of-information battles in post-Soviet Russia.

What began as an attempt to suppress a 91影视 report on nuclear dangers within Russia’s Northern Fleet became a legal struggle that lasted nearly five years. Nikitin was charged with treason and espionage for helping document environmental and safety problems associated with Russia’s nuclear submarine fleet.

The prosecution failed.

In 2000, Russia’s Supreme Court fully acquitted Nikitin, making him the only person in Russian history to defeat espionage charges brought by the country’s security services.

The institutions and individuals behind the case, however, did not disappear.

Many continued their ascent through the Russian state. Vladimir Putin, then a former KGB officer entering the Kremlin’s inner circle, would soon become president. Alexander Gutsan would later occupy some of the most powerful positions within Russia’s legal and security systems. The institutions that targeted 91影视 in the 1990s became central pillars of the political system that exists in Russia today.

Nearly three decades later, 91影视’s history with figures such as Gutsan provides a unique perspective on the evolution of the Russian state鈥攆rom the uncertain post-Soviet years to the increasingly militarized and authoritarian regime now waging war against Ukraine.

In many ways, 91影视’s history and the history of the modern FSB have unfolded in parallel. The same security structures that raided 91影视’s offices in 1995, prosecuted Alexander Nikitin, and later forced 91影视 Murmansk to close under Russia’s “foreign agent” legislation remain central to the Russian state today.

91影视 survived each of these confrontations and, in the process, accumulated a hard-earned understanding of Russia’s security institutions that few organizations anywhere in the world can match.

Preserving Expertise as War Returned to Europe

The victory in the Nikitin case allowed 91影视 to continue its work in Russia for more than two decades. It also established the organization as one of the Kremlin’s most persistent critics on issues of nuclear safety, environmental protection, government secrecy, and democratic accountability.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, 91影视 maintained offices in Murmansk and St. Petersburg and employed more than twenty staff members in the country.

The organization immediately closed its Russian operations and evacuated key personnel to safety abroad.

Today, 91影视’s experts continue to monitor developments in the Arctic, analyze the activities of Rosatom, document environmental and nuclear-security risks associated with Russia’s war against Ukraine, and support international efforts to understand and address those risks.

Their expertise is regularly sought by governments, international organizations, researchers, journalists, and civil society organizations throughout Europe and North America.

Few organizations possess comparable knowledge, networks, or access to information accumulated through more than three decades of work.

91影视’s Role in Ukraine

91影视’s history offers something increasingly rare: institutional memory.

Few organizations can draw a direct line from the environmental and nuclear struggles of the 1990s to today’s Russia. If this work disappears, Europe will lose one of its most experienced independent sources of information on Russian nuclear activities, Arctic security, environmental risks, and the long-term consequences of war.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 91影视 has devoted a significant share of its resources and expertise to understanding and documenting the environmental, nuclear, and security consequences of the conflict. Drawing on decades of experience with Russian nuclear issues, our experts have helped governments, international organizations, journalists, and researchers better understand developments that often remain hidden behind the front lines.

From the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to Rosatom’s role in the war and the long-term environmental consequences of military operations, 91影视 has sought not only to document events as they unfold, but also to identify the risks and challenges that Ukraine and Europe will face in the years ahead.

By increasing transparency, informing public debate, and helping the international community understand the realities Ukraine faces, 91影视’s work contributes to protecting Ukraine’s people, environment, and critical infrastructure during the war. Looking beyond the conflict, 91影视’s decades of experience with nuclear safety, radioactive waste management, environmental remediation, and Soviet-era industrial pollution can also help support Ukraine’s future reconstruction.

Just as 91影视 played a role in addressing some of the most dangerous environmental and nuclear legacies inherited from the Soviet Union, we hope to contribute our expertise to helping Ukraine confront and overcome the environmental consequences of war, rebuild safely, and secure a healthier future for generations to come.

A selection of our reports on Ukraine, the war, and Russia鈥檚 nuclear industry:

Rosatom 2025

What happens when one of the world’s largest nuclear corporations becomes an instrument of wartime state policy? This report examines how Rosatom has evolved beyond civilian nuclear energy into a central component of Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. 91影视 analyzes the corporation’s role in occupied Ukraine, international energy markets, and strategic infrastructure projects, and explores what these developments mean for nuclear safety, European security, and international governance.

Report:

The IAEA’s Role in Times of War

What happens when a nuclear power plant becomes a battlefield? This report examines the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and the unprecedented challenges it poses for international nuclear safety and security. 91影视 argues that existing international institutions were never designed to address the military seizure of civilian nuclear facilities and proposes reforms to prevent nuclear infrastructure from becoming a tool of war.

Report:

The Potential Restart of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Could Russia restart a nuclear reactor in the middle of an active war zone? 91影视 analyzes evidence that Russian authorities may seek to restart reactors at the occupied Zaporizhzhia plant and examines the technical, safety, and political risks such a decision would create.

Report:

The Radiation Risks of Seizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Published shortly after the plant’s seizure, this report was among the first detailed analyses of the nuclear risks posed by active warfare around a major civilian nuclear facility. Many of the dangers identified by 91影视鈥攊ncluding threats to the plant’s external power supply鈥攈ave since become central concerns for international nuclear safety authorities.

Report:

Rosatom During the War: How Militarization of the Russian Nuclear Giant Took Place

This report examines how Rosatom has increasingly become an instrument of Russian state power and wartime policy. 91影视 traces the corporation’s growing role in occupied Ukraine, Russia’s wartime economy, and the country’s broader geopolitical strategy.

Report:

Rosatom’s Role in the War in Ukraine

Published during the first months of the invasion, this 91影视 working paper was among the earliest analyses to argue that Rosatom could no longer be viewed solely as a civilian nuclear corporation. Many of the concerns raised in this early study have since become central to international discussions about sanctions, nuclear security, and Rosatom’s role in Russia’s wartime strategy.

Report:

Eliminating Russia’s Nuclear Legacy

For decades, 91影视 has been at the forefront of efforts to address the dangerous nuclear legacy left behind by the Soviet Union. This report examines what has been achieved, what remains undone, and how the war in Ukraine and the collapse of international cooperation have complicated the task of reducing long-term nuclear risks.

Report:

Rosatom in the War Years of 2023 and 2024

This report explores Rosatom’s growing role in Russia’s wartime economy, its expanding military activities, and its continuing international reach despite sanctions and political isolation. It demonstrates how Rosatom has become one of the Kremlin’s most important strategic assets.

Report:

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Nearly forty years of results for Norway and the world 鈥� but there is more work to do

Since 1986, the 91影视 Foundation in Oslo has worked to advance practical environmental solutions, technological innovation, and accountability in both government and industry. The organization has been a key driving force behind Norway鈥檚 adoption of electric vehicles and the development of carbon capture and storage, and today maintains offices in Norway, Brussels, Berlin, and Vilnius.

鈥�91影视 is my life鈥檚 work. I have spent forty years building an organization that has challenged those in power, exposed environmental crime, and helped drive forward solutions. Two weeks before our 40th anniversary, I am not willing to see that work disappear without a fight,鈥� said 91影视 founder Frederic Hauge.

Hauge argues that the 91影视 Foundation in Oslo will continue to play an important watchdog role in the years ahead, particularly in holding the oil and gas industry accountable during difficult economic times and in promoting ambitious new initiatives, such as large-scale restoration of Norway鈥檚 kelp forests.

鈥淪omeone also has to demonstrate that it is possible to cut emissions and make money at the same time. Otherwise, we risk losing the business community along the way. And if that happens, we will never get back to 1.5 degrees,鈥� Hauge said.

Employees in Vilnius could face persecution by Russian authorities

One particularly serious aspect of the crisis concerns 91影视鈥檚 office in Vilnius. Following Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 91影视 evacuated key staff members from Russia for their own safety. If the organization is unable to secure continued operations, those employees could lose their residence permits and find themselves in a highly vulnerable situation.

91影视 is currently in dialogue with donors and government authorities while pursuing both short-term financing and longer-term solutions.

鈥淲e are not asking for sympathy. We are asking for support for work that is still urgently needed. The climate crisis has not been solved. 91影视 must not disappear,鈥� said Hauge.

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These are among the trends highlighted in 91影视鈥檚

Armenia鈥檚 nuclear drift away from Moscow

Nowhere is the political dimension of nuclear energy clearer than in Armenia. Rosatom remains deeply involved in extending the life of the Metsamor nuclear power plant, whose second VVER-440 reactor was shut down in April for an unusually long five-month maintenance and modernization campaign. The work鈥攃arried out with the participation of multiple Rosatom subsidiaries鈥攊s intended to extend the plant鈥檚 operational life to 2036.

But while Russia still services Armenia鈥檚 aging Soviet-built reactor fleet, its chances of building Armenia鈥檚 future reactors appear increasingly slim.

鈥淩ussia and Rosatom traditionally play an important role in servicing the Metsamor nuclear power plant,鈥� 91影视 nuclear analyst Dmitry Gorchakov , noting Moscow鈥檚 continued role in supplying fuel, components, and modernization work. Yet he adds that 鈥渢he prospects for Rosatom鈥檚 participation in Armenia鈥檚 new nuclear program remain extremely uncertain.鈥�

That uncertainty is largely political. Armenia has accelerated discussions over building a new nuclear plant focused on small modular reactors, considering proposals from the United States, France, South Korea, and China alongside Russia鈥檚. At the same time, relations between Moscow and Yerevan have deteriorated sharply as Armenia pivots toward the European Union.

鈥淭he current political dynamic and the likelihood of pro-European forces winning upcoming elections make the prospects for Rosatom building a new Armenian nuclear plant extremely low,鈥� Gorchakov writes.

Europe鈥檚 sluggish nuclear divorce

Europe, meanwhile, continues its own uneasy disentanglement from Russia鈥檚 nuclear industry鈥攖hough progress remains uneven.

91影视鈥檚 digest shows that EU countries operating Soviet-designed VVER reactors are slowly introducing alternative fuel suppliers, primarily Westinghouse and Framatome. Westinghouse now has fuel supply contracts with every European VVER operator, while countries including Finland and the Czech Republic have already begun receiving non-Russian fuel deliveries.

But despite the political rhetoric surrounding energy independence after Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, Russian nuclear fuel continues flowing into Europe in substantial quantities.

鈥淎fter peaking in 2023, purchases of Russian nuclear fuel have begun declining, and that trend continued in 2025,鈥� . 鈥淏ut overall procurement levels still remain above prewar levels.鈥�

Indeed, 91影视鈥檚 analysis notes that between 2022 and 2025, EU countries paid Rosatom roughly 70 percent more for nuclear fuel than during the previous four-year period.

The result, Gorchakov argues, is two distinct European strategies. The first includes countries such as Finland and the Czech Republic, which are shifting toward Westinghouse fuel and actively reducing Russian purchases. The second includes countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, which remain reluctant to break with Rosatom and instead are gravitating toward France鈥檚 Framatome as an alternative supplier.

Yet even that alternative comes with caveats. Framatome still lacks a fully independent fuel-production chain for VVER reactors and is preparing to assemble Russian-designed fuel under license at facilities in France and Germany. 鈥淭his effectively preserves dependence on Russian technology in a more indirect form,鈥� Gorchakov writes.

In other words, Europe鈥檚 nuclear decoupling from Russia remains partial, politically fragmented, and technologically incomplete.

Rosatom鈥檚 Quiet Dependence on China

If Armenia and Europe illustrate Rosatom鈥檚 geopolitical vulnerabilities abroad, developments in Russia鈥檚 Arctic suggest another problem: growing dependence on China.

In late March, according to industry publication SeaNews, the hull for a new floating nuclear power unit arrived from China at St. Petersburg鈥檚 Baltic Shipyard. The floating reactor platform is part of Rosatom鈥檚 ambitious plan to power the remote Baimskaya mining region in Chukotka using a fleet of floating nuclear reactors equipped with RITM-200S reactors.

But Rosatom itself said almost nothing publicly about the delivery.

鈥淭he arrival of the first hull for the floating nuclear power unit from China took place in an atmosphere of complete informational silence from Rosatom and its subsidiaries,鈥� .

The silence is striking because the project is both strategically important and deeply symbolic. Rosatom has long promoted floating nuclear plants as a showcase of Russian technological prowess. But the first hulls are being built not in Russia, but at the Chinese shipyard Wison Heavy Industry because Russian shipyards lacked the capacity to complete the order on schedule.

The delays have been substantial. Under the original contract, the first hull was supposed to arrive in Russia by October 2023. Instead, it arrived roughly two and a half years late.

Why Rosatom has chosen not to highlight the delivery remains unclear. Gorchakov suggests several possibilities: security concerns, reluctance to expose Chinese partners to sanctions risks, or discomfort with publicly acknowledging that a major 鈥減restige project鈥� for Russia was substantially built in China.

Taken together, the stories in 91影视鈥檚 latest digest point toward a broader reality facing Rosatom in 2026. Russia鈥檚 nuclear industry remains globally active and technically capable. But geopolitical fragmentation, sanctions pressure, and shifting political alliances continue to complicate Moscow鈥檚 ability to dominate the nuclear landscape as confidently as it once did.

The post Rosatom鈥檚 Uneasy Spring: Armenia Turns Away, Europe Hesitates, China Steps In鈥攖hat and more in our new nuclear digest appeared first on 91影视.org.

Three cases from our latest digest鈥擴kraine, Turkey, and the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant II鈥攕how a strategy that is still moving forward, but increasingly under strain. 

Ukraine: Licensing reality into existence 

Nowhere is that strain more visible than at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, occupied by Russian troops since early in the invasion. Earlier this year, Russia鈥檚 nuclear regulator announced it had issued long-term licenses for two reactors at the besieged plant. On paper, Rosatom wishes to indicate progress. In practice, it鈥檚 something else entirely. 

There is no real license today that would allow these units to be put into operation鈥攍et alone听operated听for 10 years, 91影视 expert Alexander Nikitin.听

Under normal conditions, reactor licenses are the final step in a long process of construction, testing, and safety validation. None of that has happened at Zaporizhzhia. The reactors remain in cold shutdown, dependent on fragile external power lines that continue to be disrupted by nearby fighting.  

So what are these licenses for? According to Nikitin, they are less about engineering than optics: 鈥渁 forced step taken under pressure to legitimize Russian control over the station.鈥�  

That effort may already be working. Subtle changes in how international organizations refer to the plant鈥攄ropping explicit mention of Ukraine鈥攕uggest that language is beginning to shift alongside reality. But the risks to the plant remain unchanged. Military activity continues near nuclear facilities, power supply remains unstable, and safety margins are thin. 

Even beyond Zaporizhzhia, the long shadow of war is growing. Repairs to the damaged confinement structure at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant鈥攚hich was struck by a Russian drone鈥攁re expected to cost 鈧�500 million. But for now, those plans may be more aspirational than practical. 

鈥淭here is no real threat from these facilities today鈥攁nd no resources to carry out such work during the war,鈥� Nikitin notes. In other words: even nuclear safety is being triaged. 

Turkey: The Limits of Export Power 

If Ukraine shows how Russia uses nuclear tools politically, Turkey shows where the limits of that strategy begin. The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant鈥擱osatom鈥檚 flagship export project鈥攊s now years behind schedule. Its first reactor was supposed to be running by 2025, but it鈥檚 not. 

Rosatom blames sanctions. Its CEO, Alexey Likhachev, has described the project as stuck in a 鈥渟anctions meat grinder.鈥� But the consequences go deeper than delays. 

The delays are not just technical鈥攖hey have legal and economic implications, 91影视 analyst Dmitry Gorchakov.听听

Akkuyu is built under a model that leaves Rosatom carrying most of the financial risk while relying on long-term electricity purchase agreements to make the numbers work. The longer the delays, the weaker Rosatom鈥檚 bargaining position becomes. 

Turkey is clearly taking note. In March, Ankara moved forward with talks on alternative nuclear technologies, including a deal with Canada鈥檚 Candu Energy. Negotiations are also ongoing with South Korea and China. What was once expected to be Rosatom鈥檚 next big win in Turkey鈥攖he Sinop project鈥攊s no longer a given. 

As Gorchakov puts it, 鈥淪inop is now effectively an open project, without any obligations toward Rosatom.鈥�  

Kursk II: When Dates Don鈥檛 Line Up 

Back in Russia, the story is less about geopolitics and more about transparency. 

At the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant II, the first unit has reached full power鈥攁 milestone the industry likes to highlight. At the same time, international databases list the start of construction on Unit 3 as January 31, 2026. 

suggests that听date听may not be听accurate.听Evidence from regional sources and site imagery听indicates听the 鈥渇irst concrete鈥� milestone听likely occurred听weeks earlier, in late December 2025. That discrepancy may seem minor. But听in nuclear construction,听it鈥檚听not.听

鈥淭his case shows that information about the construction of Kursk-II units is being deliberately concealed,鈥� Gorchakov writes. 

The start of construction is one of the most closely tracked benchmarks in the nuclear industry. Moving it鈥攅ven by a few weeks鈥攃an obscure delays, reshape narratives, and complicate oversight. And it raises a broader question: if even basic milestones are unclear, what else is? 

Read our full article on the strange data from Kursk II .听听

The Bigger Picture 

Taken together, these cases point to a nuclear strategy that is still active鈥攂ut increasingly reactive. In Ukraine, Russia is trying to regulate its way into legitimacy. In Turkey, it is losing ground in a market it once seemed to dominate. And at home, it is struggling to maintain transparency even on its own projects. 

None of this means Rosatom is in retreat. Its global footprint remains large, and its projects continue to move forward. But the corporation鈥檚 narrative of steady expansion is becoming harder to sustain. Read this and more in the new digest.  

The post Questionable licenses,听delays, and听obscured construction听data and more in 91影视鈥檚 new nuclear digest听 appeared first on 91影视.org.

Two events highlighted in 91影视鈥檚 l鈥攖he disabling of the LNG tanker Arctic Metagas and a series of tanker detentions in European waters鈥攗nderscore growing vulnerabilities in how Russia moves its Arctic oil and gas to market.

Explosion on the Arctic Metagas shadow tanker

, the LNG carrier Arctic Metagas was disabled by an explosion in the Mediterranean Sea, leaving it adrift with liquefied natural gas and heavy fuel on board. While the immediate impact was logistical, the incident also exposed a serious risk: the environmental fragility of Russia鈥檚 Arctic energy model.

A drifting LNG tanker is not just a shipping problem鈥攊t is a potential environmental emergency. Although no major spill was reported, the presence of fuel oil and LNG aboard a disabled vessel highlights what could happen if a similar incident occurred closer to Arctic waters. In such conditions, containment and cleanup operations would be far more difficult, if not impossible.

91影视 analysts have repeatedly warned that Russia lacks the capacity to respond effectively to oil spills in harsh, ice-covered environments. The Arctic Metagas incident serves as a reminder that accidents involving Arctic energy shipments are not hypothetical鈥攖hey are already happening.

At the same time, the disruption triggered a chain reaction across the Northern Sea Route. Tankers rerouted away from the Mediterranean, cargo accumulated in Arctic storage, and vessels idled at sea waiting to unload.

For 91影视, this combination of logistical fragility and environmental risk is telling.

鈥淭his highlights the vulnerability of logistics for sanctioned Russian gas,鈥� our analysts note. 鈥淎ny incident involving a shadow LNG tanker can significantly slow down or halt shipments.鈥�

But beyond logistics, the implication is broader: the expansion of Arctic LNG exports is happening in a context where both infrastructure and emergency response systems remain inadequate. In a region already under pressure from climate change, even a single accident could have outsized and long-lasting consequences.

Tanker Detentions: Pressure at Sea

At the same time, Russia鈥檚 oil exports are facing growing friction in international waters. , which was carrying Arctic oil from Murmansk under what authorities suspect was a falsified flag. The vessel is now under investigation, marking the second such case in recent months.

The UK has gone further, authorizing its military to inspect and detain Russian shadow fleet vessels passing through its waters, effectively raising the risks for any tanker attempting to transit key maritime chokepoints.

91影视 analysts see this as a turning point.

鈥淭here were signs of real progress toward countering the Russian shadow fleet,鈥� we note. 鈥淚f this practice becomes established and scaled up, it could significantly hinder the illegal transportation of Russian oil.鈥�

The mechanism is simple but effective. Many of these tankers operate with questionable documentation鈥攗nclear ownership, false flags, or manipulated tracking data. Inspections and detentions introduce delays, and delays undermine the economics of Russian oil.

鈥淎ny delay disrupts deliveries, making the supplier significantly less attractive to buyers,鈥� we point out, even when prices are low.

There is also an environmental dimension. Rather than targeting oil infrastructure directly鈥攔isking spills in fragile Arctic ecosystems鈥攄etaining vessels at sea offers a lower-risk way to constrain exports.

A System Under Strain

Taken together, the disruption of Arctic Metagas and the tightening net around shadow tankers point to a common theme: Russia鈥檚 Arctic energy model is increasingly exposed at the level of logistics.

Production continues. Icebreakers still escort vessels. Cargo still moves. But the system is becoming less predictable, less efficient, and more vulnerable to disruption鈥攚hether from a single strike in the Mediterranean or a document check in European waters.

The post Arctic gas disrupted and tankers detained: new risks for Russia鈥檚 northern energy strategy鈥攖he new Arctic Digest is out appeared first on 91影视.org.

But this site is also the Russian nuclear power plant closest to the border with Ukraine. Likely for this reason, Rosatom is carrying out construction under conditions of limited transparency鈥攅ither not publicly disclosing key construction milestones or doing so with significant delays and inconsistencies. This has led to confusion even at the level of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

To read the rest of this article, click

The post The curious, secretive case of the Kursk II nuclear power plant鈥檚 weird data appeared first on 91影视.org.

For the past 40 years, the wastes of the Chernobyl site have stood as a monument to human arrogance, the danger of secrets, the plodding ineptitude of repressive regimes, and the catastrophes that occur when they all intersect.  At a remove of four decades鈥攁nd after the production of an enormous scientific and cultural literature on the disaster鈥攊t鈥檚 tempting to say we鈥檝e learned our lesson.

The word 鈥淐hernobyl鈥� itself has passed into our collective lexicon as synonym for catastrophe, and the UN a decade ago April 26鈥攖he day in 1986 that Chernobyl鈥檚 No 4 reactor exploded鈥攁s an international Day of Remembrance, a dark honor that the disaster鈥檚 anniversary shares with the likes of the Holocaust and the transatlantic slave trade.

Surely鈥攚e terribly wish to say as a civilized society鈥攚e鈥檝e put this sort of thing behind us. Right?

A Russian military drone that blew a hole in the dome protecting the world from the No 4 Reactor鈥檚 still-highly radioactive entrails suggests otherwise. In fact, as the ruby anniversary of the world鈥檚 worst nuclear accident arrives this Sunday, we鈥檙e discovering newer ways to endanger nuclear power plants鈥攖his time by making them targets of war.

Since its invasion of Ukraine commenced in February of 2022, Moscow鈥檚 troops have invaded and attacked the Chernobyl site, bombed a research reactor at Kharkiv鈥檚 Institute of Physics and Technology in Ukraine鈥檚 east, and taken over Europe鈥檚 largest civilian nuclear power plant, the six-reactor Ukrainian facility at Zaporizhzhia, claiming the facility as Russian property.  All the while, Russian supersonic missiles continue to whiz within mere kilometers of not just Chernobyl, but Ukraine鈥檚 operating Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant as well.

What鈥檚 more, all of this is becoming quite routine. In recent weeks, Washington鈥攖he same world capital that was aghast at Russia鈥檚 attacks on Ukrainian nuclear facilities鈥攖argeted Iran鈥檚 Bushehr nuclear plant in an attack of its own. The rest of the world meanwhile is more or less powerless to stop it. Indeed, the UN鈥檚 International Atomic Energy Agency鈥攚ith its vague mandate to encourage and oversee the safe and peaceful use of atomic energy鈥攊s empowered by its governing body (which includes representatives from Russia and the US) to do little more than be officially horrified. It is a posture that鈥檚鈥� unequal to what鈥檚 at stake.

The Chernobyl disaster remains one of the defining moments in the twilight years of the Soviet Union. Moscow sought to obscure the disaster while quietly evacuating more than 116,000 people from the area surrounding the plant in the days after the reactor exploded. It would be Swedish authorities who finally pierced Moscow鈥檚 official silence when they announced mysterious spikes in their own radiation monitoring systems. What they detected was a plume of radioactive material ejected into the atmosphere, causing a public health emergency across Europe and leading to a skepticism toward nuclear energy that would last decades.

It was in the long shadow of the catastrophe that the 91影视 Foundation was born. Founded in Norway in the years following the disaster, we emerged from a growing recognition that nuclear risks did not respect national borders, and that independent scrutiny of nuclear safety鈥攑articularly within the former Soviet Union鈥攚as urgently needed. What began as a response to secrecy and contamination in the wake of Chernobyl has since evolved into decades of work tracking nuclear hazards, advocating for transparency and environmental rights鈥攁nd nearly single-handedly spearheading the cleanup of generations radioactive waste and nuclear hazards in Russia鈥檚 northwest.

The human toll of the Chernobyl explosion was likewise obscured. Officially, it stands at 31 dead鈥攁 figure many experts say is ludicrously low. In the following years, hundreds of people involved with quelling the disaster鈥檚 effects fell ill, and many eventually died. Cancer rates, especially for thyroid cancer, increased in areas heavily exposed to radiation. In later interviews, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet president on whose watch the Chernobyl accident occurred, would identify the catastrophe as one of the most important factors hastening the Soviet collapse.

Forty years after that calamity, Moscow itself has wrought renewed disaster at Chernobyl. In the opening days of its invasion, Russian troops overran the Exclusion Zone鈥攖he 2,6000-square-kilometer area around the plant where radiation levels remain high and public access is limited鈥攚here their tanks and transports churned up radioactive dust. Soldiers looted and vandalized workshops necessary to the ongoing decommissioning of not only the No 4 reactor, but the plant鈥檚 three remaining reactors as well, the last of which was finally shut down in 2000.

The soldiers dug trenches and set fires in an area known as the Red Forest鈥攁 gnarled expanse of irradiated woodland鈥攕corching some 14,000 hectares of land, filling the air with so much radioactive smoke that it was unsafe for firefighters to quell the blazes. Hundreds of Chernobyl workers and technicians who oversee the site鈥檚 sprawling network of spent fuel storage facilities and the enormous effort to dismantle the radioactive remnants of the exploded No. 4 reactor, were held hostage onsite.

Looting and petty destruction by Russian troops was general. Computers, dosimeters, lab tools, firefighting equipment and even appliances were stolen. Office doors were ripped off hinges, windows smashed, walls spray-painted with graffiti. Human excrement was left behind on control panels as a calling card.

After a month of marauding鈥攁nd amid of radiation sickness among its troops鈥擱ussia abruptly withdrew on March 22, 2022, and, in a bizarrely official ceremony, handed control of the plant back to the Ukrainians. According to the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which has financed much of the Chernobyl cleanup work since the original 1986 disaster, the Russian Army鈥檚 destructive adventure in the world鈥檚 most famous radioactive wasteland left behind some 鈧�100 million in damage.

That, however, would not be the end of it. A drone attack on Chernobyl, coming in February of 2025, ruptured the so-called New Safe Confinement, a 鈧�1.5 billion dome that has protected the No 4 reactor since 2016. Designed to replace the crumbling concrete sarcophagus poured over the remains of the reactor by Soviet liquidators, the dome houses the still ongoing removal of 200 tons of molten nuclear fuel left inside.

It鈥檚 an enormous鈥攁nd enormously complicated鈥攕tructure. Standing as tall as a football pitch is long and weighing more than 31,000 tons, the New Safe Confinement is the world鈥檚 largest movable object. The sarcophagus it now shelters was never built to last. By the mid-1990s, cracks had opened, leaks had formed, and the whole brittle shell was sagging under its own weight.

To avoid being exposed to radiation, the new dome structure was built about a half a kilometer away from the sarcophagus, then moved into place on rails. In addition to the securing the melted fuel, the structure protects the outside environmental from some 30 tons of highly contaminated dust and 16 tons of uranium and plutonium that continue to release high levels of radiation.

In places, the structure measures about 12 meters between its inner and outer shells, and the space between them is kept at low humidity to prevent corrosion. The outer shell keeps out the elements. The inner shell is designed to contain the radioactive dust inside the structure, especially when the cranes that are set up within it start dismantling the sarcophagus and the damaged reactor before safely disposing of the waste in smaller containers.

Ukrainian specialists overseeing the cleanup had aimed to start that dismantlement stage this year, but the drone attack has made that impossible. According to those 91影视 has spoken to, none of that work can move forward until a full repair process has been completed鈥攚hich is not expected .

Makeshift repairs, meanwhile, are keeping radioactive dust inside the shelter, and, almost miraculously, no radiation spikes have been recorded since the initial attack. But ongoing Russian strikes around the Chernobyl site continue to threaten the now-enfeebled structure, which the EBRD will cost some 鈧�500 million to fully repair.

Naturally, the IAEA has warned again and again against such attacks and wrung its hands over the apparent normalization of military aggression against some of the most sensitive industrial sites constructed by man. But the composition of its board of governors, and its enforced apolitical stance, prevent it from censuring, or even naming, the obvious culprits. Because of this, the international body is little more than a paid mourner at the funeral of the rules-based international order.  From the attacks on Chernobyl, to the seizure of Zaporizhzhia, to the US strike on Bushehr, the agency can do little but express 鈥渄eep concern.鈥�

This paralysis of deep concern was what we had 40 years ago when a radioactive cloud of hidden origin darkened the skies over Europe and turned hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens into refugees from their own government鈥檚 secrets. One would hope that 40 years of staring into the rubble of one of humanity鈥檚 biggest mistakes would have brought us more wisdom and enlightenment.

That it hasn鈥檛 is partially a failure of collective imagination. After Chernobyl, we thought we鈥檇 seen the worst thing that could happen to a nuclear power plant. No one鈥攏ot world governments, not the designers of Chernobyl鈥檚 New Safe Confinement, not the IAEA鈥攅ver accounted for deliberate military attacks on civilian nuclear power stations. It was unthinkable.

Now that it鈥檚 not, we must work together鈥擭GOs, governments, and people alike鈥攖o make it unthinkable again. As an organization, 91影视 has proposed beginning the conversation on what, exactly, international oversight for the safety of nuclear power plants should look like. It鈥檚 clear that we need a transnational agency that has the authority to do more than offer hopes and prayers when nuclear plants become military targets.

Such a system would have to emerge from the international community itself, but the time for that discussion has clearly arrived. Until it does, however, we鈥檙e left exactly where we were in 1986, watching helplessly as disaster unfolds.

The post After Chernobyl we said ‘never again.’ Then came the war. appeared first on 91影视.org.

Hungary鈥檚 nuclear build:听鈥楢听sanctions听meat听grinder鈥�听

Hungary鈥檚 Paks-2 nuclear power plant, built by Russia鈥檚 Rosatom, reached a symbolic milestone with the pouring of first concrete. But behind the ceremony, 91影视 expert Dmitry Gorchakov  that the project is under strain. 

He says the milestone comes years late鈥攁nd under difficult conditions. What was once planned for 2022 has only now begun, delayed by a combination of regulatory and geopolitical obstacles. More fundamentally, Gorchakov says, the project has become entangled in sanctions pressure. 

鈥淧aks-2 has fallen into a 鈥榮anctions meat grinder,鈥欌�� according to Rosatom head Alexei Likhachev, Gorchakov notes, placing it alongside other delayed Rosatom projects facing similar constraints.  

The breakdown of cooperation with Siemens Energy illustrates the problem. Export licensing restrictions from Germany halted delivery of key control systems, forcing Rosatom to seek replacements. While Russian or European alternatives are being discussed, their availability and compatibility remain uncertain. 

Our analysis suggests that Paks-2 is no longer just an infrastructure project. It is a geopolitical balancing act. Hungary鈥檚 continued cooperation with Rosatom stands in contrast to broader European efforts to reduce reliance on Russian nuclear technology, leaving the project exposed to political and economic turmoil. 

At the same time, in light of the results of the April 12 elections in Hungary and the departure of Viktor Orb谩n鈥檚 government, the position of the new Hungarian authorities toward this project may change in the near future and become less favorable. 

Kozloduy:听鈥榤uch听harder听than听it听seems鈥� to switch parts听

If Paks-2 shows the impact of sanctions on new projects, Bulgaria鈥檚 Kozloduy plant reveals how difficult it is to disentangle existing systems from Russian supply chains. 

Attempts to replace Russian-made components with local alternatives led to repeated shutdowns of one reactor unit, after newly installed parts failed. The episode underscores the risks of rapid substitution in highly specialized systems. 

The situation 鈥渟hows how difficult it can be to find replacements for all supplies from Russia and fully abandon them,鈥� Gorchakov .  

The challenge, he argues, is deeper than many policymakers assume. Europe鈥檚 dependence extends far beyond nuclear fuel to include niche components with limited or nonexistent alternative suppliers. 鈥淢any such parts are harder to replace simply because there is no market for them,鈥� he adds.  

This creates a dilemma for Soviet-built nuclear plants in Europe鈥攃ontinue limited cooperation with Russian suppliers or invest in developing new production capacity. We suggest that a coordinated European approach may be necessary, including joint programs to manufacture replacement components for Soviet-designed reactors. Without such efforts, the transition away from Russian technology risks introducing new operational vulnerabilities, particularly in aging plants undergoing life-extension programs. 

The听end of听the听New START听only the latest treaty abandoned听

Beyond civilian nuclear energy, 91影视 warns that strategic stability is also eroding. The expiration of the New START Treaty removes one of the last remaining frameworks for nuclear arms control between Russia and the United States. 

In recent years, Gorchakov , there has been 鈥渁 gradual abandonment of long-standing agreements in the field of nuclear arms control,鈥� accompanied by rising nuclear rhetoric and renewed military signaling.  

The Arctic is emerging as a key area of concern. Home to Russia鈥檚 Northern Fleet and a large share of its nuclear arsenal, the region is already heavily militarized. Without treaty limits, Gorchakov warns, there are few constraints on further expansion. 

鈥淥nly political will can restrain Russia from potentially increasing its nuclear arsenal in the Arctic,鈥� Gorchakov says.  

According to 91影视鈥檚 estimates, Russia could relatively quickly increase the number of deployed warheads on existing naval platforms, adding roughly 100 more without major technical hurdles. The loss of transparency and verification mechanisms raises the risk of miscalculation, with implications far beyond the Arctic. In our analysis, this marks a broader weakening of the global nuclear order. 

A System Under Strain听

Taken together, these developments point to a nuclear sector under growing stress. Projects like Paks-2 are slowed by sanctions and political friction. Existing plants like Kozloduy struggle with the legacy of technological dependence. And at the strategic level, the collapse of arms control agreements is increasing uncertainty. 

91影视鈥檚 experts see these trends as interconnected. The same geopolitical tensions reshaping energy supply chains are also undermining long-standing security frameworks. Read about these developments and many more in our .  

The post ‘Sanctions听meat听grinder,鈥� fragile supply chains, and听nuclear听risk鈥攖he February Nuclear Digest shows growing strains appeared first on 91影视.org.

Now, alarm bells have started ringing about the Bushehr NPP in Iran. 

All these facilities were built based on Russian designs and are, to varying degrees, linked to a single state nuclear corporation 鈥� Rosatom.

Russia has long been actively involved in Iran鈥檚 nuclear program. The largest project within this cooperation is the Bushehr NPP. Construction of the first unit at the site began as early as 1975 by the West German company Kraftwerk Union, but was halted in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution. 

Then, in 1995, Russia signed contracts to complete the unit using a VVER-1000 reactor and to  nuclear fuel for the first ten years of its operation. Russia is also  to taking back spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing.

The unit was connected to the grid in 2011 and entered commercial operation in 2013. A year later, a contract was signed for the construction of the second phase of the plant, consisting of two additional VVER-1000 units with a total cost of around $10 billion. Notably, the project has been  by Iran without the use of Russian loans. 

At present, Rosatom is involved in the construction of the second unit at Bushehr, although the bulk of the work is being carried out by local contractors. Construction of the third unit has not yet officially begun.

In September 2025, an  to build a second Russian-designed nuclear power plant in Iran, in the Sirik area of the Hormozgan region. The project includes four reactor units with a total capacity of 5,020 MW. Its estimated cost is around $25 billion and, unlike Bushehr, it is expected to .

However, in the context of the ongoing full-scale war in Iran, the prospects for any large-scale nuclear construction in the near future appear highly uncertain.

Why Bushehr Is Not Related to Iran鈥檚 Enriched Uranium Problem

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is not directly linked to Iran’s potential military nuclear program. The plant has operated under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards since the very beginning, giving inspectors access to the facility and operational data so they can monitor it to ensure that nuclear materials used there are not diverted for military purposes.

Even when, after the U.S. and Israel attacks in June 2025, Iran  its cooperation with the IAEA, it partially  the agency’s access to the Bushehr NPP. Apparently, for the simple reason that Iran truly has nothing to hide at this station.

Most of the debate in recent years surrounding Iran鈥檚 increasingly advanced nuclear program has focused on facilities other than Bushehr. These include, above all, uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow (which rely on indigenous enrichment technologies, rather than Russian imports), the nuclear complex in Isfahan and the heavy water reactor in Arak, which has been suspected of being used for plutonium production.

All these facilities were targeted in attacks both in June 2025 and February-March 2026. Fortunately, according to the IAEA, these strikes did not result in significant environmental consequences or radioactive releases, partly because many of them are located underground.

Particular concern also surrounds a stockpile of slightly over 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%, which could be further enriched relatively quickly to higher levels suitable for producing nuclear weapons. 

Its exact location remains unknown. But the attacks on the aforementioned facilities in Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow appear to be aimed both at destroying this material (or, more precisely, burying it under the debris of underground storage sites) and at disabling the centrifuges used for its enrichment.  suggested there are plans for a U.S. special forces operation aimed at seizing this uranium.

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant also hosts a significant amount of nuclear material 鈥� approximately 210 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel and around 70 tons of fuel in the reactor core,  Rosatom鈥檚 CEO. However, these materials are subject to safeguards and accounting by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and their use for nuclear weapons purposes (for example, through the extraction of plutonium from spent fuel) is highly unlikely due to the relatively low suitability of reactor-grade plutonium for weapons use and the need for complex reprocessing infrastructure.

According to the author鈥檚 estimates, this volume of spent fuel broadly corresponds to what would be expected from a VVER-1000 reactor operating since 2011. At the same time, it suggests that, despite the intergovernmental agreement to return spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr to Russia, the material has, in practice, continued to accumulate in Iran over the years.

Nuclear Risks at the Bushehr NPP During Wartime

Such a volume of nuclear material on site 鈥� and, more importantly, the presence of the country鈥檚 most powerful operating nuclear reactor 鈥� makes the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant the  facility in Iran in terms of potential environmental consequences in the event of an attack.

In the worst-case scenario, a direct hit by a missile or bomb on a reactor unit could damage the operating reactor and lead to the release of radioactive materials, with potential consequences extending to neighboring countries.

Being a civilian facility under IAEA safeguards has not fully shielded Bushehr from attacks, whether intentional or incidental. Concerns about such risks already emerged during the first Israeli and U.S. Twelve-Day War against Iran in June 2025. At the time, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly had  with Israeli leadership to secure the safety of 鈥渕ore than 200鈥� Russian specialists working at the plant. 

However, no strikes on or near the facility were recorded at that stage, nor did Rosatom report any suspension of construction activities or evacuation of personnel.

However, in March 2026, Iran claimed there were already  in which projectiles struck the vicinity of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant on March 17, 24 and 27. An attack was also  near the city of Bushehr, just a few hundred meters from the plant on February 28. In all cases, no casualties or damage to the facility itself was reported.

Unlike in 2025, Rosatom began evacuating personnel on the very first day of the crisis. The  evacuated were primarily employees鈥� children and non-essential staff, leaving  at the site. 

By March 12, an additional 150 people had been evacuated, followed by another 163 on March 25. Th

With many of the staff due to ve evacuated in the coming days, Rosatom ultimately  to retain only a minimal team of several dozen personnel who will 鈥渕aintain the operability of the plant, ensure the preservation of equipment, and support the functioning of the residential settlement where the workers live.鈥�

According to Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev, the first unit of the Bushehr NPP continues to operate, with no plans from the Iranian side to shut it down. This increases the risk of a nuclear incident in the event of damage not only to the reactor itself but also to surrounding infrastructure.

Experience from the frontline Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine shows that attacks on a country鈥檚 broader energy infrastructure can also pose a serious threat to nuclear sites. Such attacks may disconnect a reactor from the grid, causing a station blackout and the emergency shutdown of an operating unit. Such a scenario could potentially result in a large-scale radiological accident.

Against this backdrop, particular concern is raised by repeatedly stated intentions by U.S. President Donald Trump to target Iran鈥檚 power infrastructure, including  鈥渁 very strong hit on each of their power plants, and likely simultaneously,鈥� as well as calling to 鈥渟trike and destroy鈥� Iranian power plants, .鈥�

Although the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is not even among the five most powerful power stations in Iran 鈥� being smaller than several gas- and oil-fired plants 鈥� the risks of disrupting the plant鈥檚 power supply and triggering a reactor shutdown remain significant.

A Troubling Trend

Against the backdrop of long-standing threats from the Iranian regime and well-founded concerns about its nuclear program, it is understandable that discussions about how to locate and neutralize 400 kg of enriched uranium are attracting global attention. However, other developments are equally concerning鈥攁nd are already forming a dangerous trend.

Over the past four years, civilian nuclear energy facilities have increasingly become targets of direct or indirect attacks in armed conflicts: in Ukraine (including the Zaporizhzhia NPP and other facilities across the country), at the Kursk NPP in Russia鈥攍ocated close to the Ukrainian border and also exposed to risks of attacks (intentional or otherwise), construction delays, and personnel evacuations鈥攁nd now at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. Ironically, all of these facilities were built based on Russian designs, and all are, to varying degrees, linked to a single state nuclear corporation鈥擱osatom.

It is difficult to predict how this will ultimately unfold. What is already clear, however, is that neither national authorities, nor international coalitions, nor even UN bodies such as the IAEA are capable of guaranteeing the effective protection of civilian nuclear facilities during armed conflicts. One can only hope that in the coming years we will not witness a man-made nuclear accident at a nuclear power plant caused by military activity, and that the international nuclear community will eventually draw lessons from this turbulent period and develop more effective mechanisms to minimize such risks in the future.

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Tvedten is the project manager for the Clean Hull Initiative (CHI) and has led the work on the new ISO-standard known as ISO 6319, titled 鈥淐onducting and documenting in-water cleaning of biofouling on ships鈥�.听

One of the key solutions for managing biofouling on ships鈥攈ull cleaning鈥攃an help prevent the spread of invasive aquatic species and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ISO 6319 supports these practices by ensuring that hull cleaning is carried out responsibly and does not release organisms or chemicals into the environment.听

鈥淥n Wednesday, the standard was finally published, and I鈥檓 delighted to share that it is now available for global stakeholders in shipping and ports,鈥� says Tvedten. 

ISO 6319 aims to help ports and regulators request documentation from service providers intending to clean ship hulls, making it easier to assess whether the technology used provides adequate environmental protection. 

One of the contributors to ISO 6319 was Port Environment Expert at Port of Antwerp-Bruges, Luc Van Espen. He explains that at the Port of Antwerp-Bruges, hull cleaning is permitted as part of the port鈥檚 commitment to sustainable shipping. 

鈥淎n internationally accepted and applied standard creates a level playing field among seaports worldwide, strongly limiting the transfer of invasive alien species from one port to another,鈥� says Van Espen. 

Globally, approval procedures vary widely among ports and authorities, creating challenges for shipowners. Wallenius Wilhelmsen, a leading global RoRo operator, was among the shipowners contributing to ISO 6319 and is working to lower fleet emissions through enhanced hull maintenance. 

“When applications follow the same structure and technical specifications, ports and authorities can process them more efficiently. For us as a shipping company, this means fewer operational disruptions and greater predictability,鈥� says Senior Manager Kim-Helge Brynjulfsen at Wallenius Wilhelmsen.  

Another contributor to ISO 6319 was Jotun, a global leader in marine coatings to tackle biofouling, which also offers a proactive hull-cleaning robot and compatible coatings. 

鈥淎t Jotun, we find that many ports and authorities lack detailed knowledge about hull cleaning and are often unnecessarily sceptical of cleaning ships. ISO 6319 can help ports assess permits on a case-by-case basis, depending on whether the hull cleaning technology sufficiently protects the environment. There are significant quality differences between hull cleaning systems,鈥� says Petter Korslund, Regulatory Affairs Manager at Jotun, one of the many contributors to the new standard. 

鈥淚SO 6319 helps guide approval authorities as to what the actual risks of cleaning are and how to manage and mitigate those risks to the greatest extent possible while promoting the environmentally-sound cleaning of ships.鈥� says Mark Riggio, one of the contributors to ISO 6319, and technical director at BEMA, an organisation consisting of several hull-cleaning service providers. 

鈥淚n the group developing this standard, competitors have put commercial interests aside and collaborated to set the terms for hull cleaning. I鈥檓 truly impressed by their efforts,鈥� says Tvedten. 

Originally, the standard was initiated by the Clean Hull Initiative, which consists of a range of stakeholders with a shared interest in proactive hull cleaning鈥攎eaning sufficiently frequent cleaning to maintain a thin layer of biofouling on the hull. The group produced the original draft four years ago, under the leadership of 91影视.  

鈥淧orts and regulators play a key role in enabling or prohibiting hull cleaning. ISO 6319 will help them make informed decisions,”听Tvedten concludes.听
听

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Rosatom鈥檚 foreign revenues take a dip…

In early January 2026, Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev presented the corporation鈥檚 annual results. According to the data he cited, Rosatom鈥檚 open (non-classified) revenue exceeded 3 trillion rubles in 2025, with roughly half generated by new high-technology projects developed in recent years.

But Rosatom鈥檚 foreign revenues slipped a bit in 2025, down to $16.5 billion from more than $18 billion the previous year. While that鈥檚 only a modest decline, it nonetheless marks the first drop in several years for a company that has long relied on international expansion as a cornerstone of its geopolitical strategy. Rosatom still maintains a $200 billion portfolio of foreign orders, largely tied to the construction of nuclear power plants abroad, including some in Europe, as well as long-term fuel supply contracts.

In fact, despite the recent downturn, Rosatom remains one of the world鈥檚 most powerful nuclear energy companies, controlling roughly 40 percent of global uranium enrichment services and a significant share of the nuclear fuel market.

91影视 nuclear analyst Dmitry Gorchakov that Rosatom鈥檚 downward blip in export revenue could reflect growing pressure on Rosatom鈥檚 international business. Western governments have increasingly sought to reduce dependence on Russian nuclear technology and fuel supplies as the invasion of Ukraine grinds on, while sanctions and political tensions complicate new contracts in some regions.

At the same time, Rosatom is increasingly redirecting its efforts toward markets in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa鈥攔egions where demand for nuclear energy is rising and political resistance to cooperation with Russia is generally lower, Gorchakov observes.

While China becomes a major buyer of Russian enriched uranium

One of the most significant developments in Asia, as well as on the global nuclear fuel market, is the rapid expansion of China鈥檚 imports of Russian enriched uranium.

China significantly increased its purchases of Russian enriched uranium in 2025, helping drive overall imports to a record level. Chinese utilities spent billions of dollars on imported nuclear fuel as Beijing continued to expand one of the world鈥檚 fastest-growing nuclear power programs.

According to industry data, China imported hundreds of additional tons of Russian enriched uranium product compared with the previous year鈥攁n increase large enough to approach the annual fuel requirements of France鈥檚 entire nuclear reactor fleet.

For Rosatom, these sales provide a valuable alternative market at a time when Western countries are attempting to reduce reliance on Russian nuclear fuel services.

91影视鈥檚 Gorchakov that this shift reflects a broader geopolitical realignment in the nuclear energy sector. As the United States and European countries attempt to build independent supply chains, Russia is strengthening cooperation with countries that are rapidly expanding their nuclear power capacity鈥攎ost notably China.

At the same time, Gorchakov warns that relying too heavily on a limited number of large customers could create new vulnerabilities for Rosatom in the future. Moreover, available data indicate that Russia sells enriched uranium to China at significantly lower prices than to Western countries, making such a shift in buyers less financially advantageous for Rosatom.

The US plays catch-up, investing $2.7 billion in enrichment

Across the ocean, the United States is attempting to rebuild domestic uranium enrichment capabilities after decades of decline.

In January 2026, the U.S. Department of Energy announced $2.7 billion in funding to expand domestic uranium enrichment capacity over the next decade. The funding will support the production of both conventional low-enriched uranium (LEU) used in contemporary nuclear reactors and high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), a specialized fuel required for many next-generation nuclear reactor designs.

Three companies鈥擜merican Centrifuge Operating, General Matter, and Orano Federal Services鈥攔eceived contracts of roughly $900 million each to expand enrichment capacity in the United States.

The initiative is part of a broader effort by Washington to reduce dependence on Russian nuclear fuel supplies, 91影视鈥檚 Gorchakov . Russia currently dominates the global enrichment market and remains the only commercial supplier of certain types of advanced nuclear fuel.

Taken together, these developments highlight a rapidly changing global nuclear fuel market. Rosatom still occupies a dominant position thanks to its vertically integrated nuclear fuel cycle and extensive reactor construction portfolio. But the combination of declining export revenue, Western efforts to diversify fuel supply, and growing competition in enrichment technologies suggests that the company鈥檚 position could face increasing challenges in the coming decade. At the same time, rising nuclear energy demand鈥攑articularly in Asia鈥攎eans that global competition for uranium enrichment services is likely to intensify.

As 91影视 Gorchakov points out, the nuclear fuel market is entering a period of strategic transformation. The balance between major suppliers such as Russia, the United States, and emerging nuclear powers will play a role in shaping the future of global nuclear energy.

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When the European Free Trade Association Court establishes that the Norwegian continental shelf falls under the EEA Agreement, it challenges one of the main arguments Norwegian authorities have used to keep the EU鈥檚 new industrial regulations at arm鈥檚 length.

At the heart of the case is the EU鈥檚 regulation on manufacturing net-zero technologies, known as the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA). The regulation aims to make Europe more self-sufficient in clean technologies 鈥� from renewable energy and batteries to carbon capture and storage.

The goal is to streamline permitting processes, mobilize investment, and build a competitive green industry in Europe.

Required of all oil producers

In the broader picture, the NZIA has been well received by both industry and EU member states. Norwegian authorities also support its overall ambition. But one provision has generated significant resistance: the requirement that oil and gas producers contribute to developing so-called CO鈧� injection capacity for storage.

If Europe is to succeed with CCS, someone must develop CO鈧� storage sites. The EU believes that responsibility lies with oil and gas producers. The NZIA therefore assigns producers a role in investing in the necessary CO鈧� storage capacity.

Until now, the disagreement has centered on whether the Norwegian continental shelf is covered by the EEA Agreement. A key argument from Norwegian authorities has been that the continental shelf falls outside the geographic scope of the agreement.

The continental shelf is covered by the EEA

91影视 has argued the opposite for more than 15 years in cases related to offshore safety and CO鈧� storage and welcomes the fact that the EFTA Court reached the same conclusion.

With the court now establishing that the continental shelf is covered by the EEA Agreement, it becomes difficult to argue that regulations on CO鈧� storage do not apply. 91影视 believes the consequence of the ruling is that Norway must incorporate the entire NZIA into Norwegian law, including the requirement to develop storage capacity.

That would not only be a legal clarification, but also an industrial policy decision with significant ripple effects.

Norway has unique geological conditions for storing CO鈧�, and several companies are already developing storage projects. Being covered by the NZIA could give Norwegian companies the same competitive conditions as the rest of the European market. At the same time, Norwegian industry would gain greater certainty that domestic storage capacity will exist when its own emissions must be managed.

Potential cuts of 11 million tonnes

The potential is considerable 鈥� and crucial for Norway. Carbon capture and storage could reduce Norwegian emissions by 11 million tonnes of CO鈧� annually, roughly one-fifth of the country鈥檚 total greenhouse gas emissions.

Licenses have already been granted that could enable the storage of more than 25 million tonnes of CO鈧� per year by 2030. In other words, the ambition to establish CO鈧� storage as a new industry on the Norwegian continental shelf is already in place. What remains behind are the national framework conditions for CO鈧� capture and the requirements needed to ensure that storage capacity is actually developed.

Here, incorporating the NZIA could act as a catalyst. The regulation would impose clear requirements but also provide predictability and speed in the development process. The EFTA Court鈥檚 ruling may therefore prove to be the push needed to accelerate an effort that has long been necessary.

At the same time, the final word has not yet been spoken. Norway鈥檚 Supreme Court will still consider the case, and several legal processes related to the NZIA are ongoing in Europe. If the Supreme Court were to disregard the EFTA Court鈥檚 opinion鈥攚hich it itself requested鈥攊t could trigger a serious crisis in Norway鈥檚 relationship with the EU.

91影视 believes Energy Minister Terje Aasland must accept that the continental shelf is part of the EEA Agreement. Time is running short as 2030 approaches. If companies are to build the storage capacity that now appears increasingly likely to be required, clarity is urgently needed.

The question is no longer whether Norway must relate to the EU鈥檚 CO鈧� storage requirements鈥攂ut how and how quickly.

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The most successful disinformation campaigns are those that seize on preexisting fissures in society to drive us further apart. Any robust democracy has plenty. But we should not despair; with a more discerning eye, every voter can contribute to the fight against these harmful campaigns.  

The misconceptions around disinformation begin with the general public understanding of its definition. Disinformation is the strategic deployment of false or misleading information with an intent to deceive, such as foreign interference campaigns crafted to mislead voters. This is distinct from misinformation, which is false or misleading information shared without a malign intent, for example, when a crazy aunt or uncle shares dubious information on social media because they think it鈥檚 鈥渋nteresting.鈥� When we discuss disinformation, we are focusing on those who intentionally share deceptive narratives, not the innocent pensioners who they鈥檝e duped.  

Second, the public often mischaracterizes the means through which disinformation is spread, as well as the narratives it discusses. Because many people were first introduced to the concept of online disinformation through Russia鈥檚 2016 interference in the U.S. election, when the media placed undue focus on easy-to-spot bot and troll accounts that made clearly false, inflammatory posts, as well as advertisements purchased in rubles, many people believe online influence campaigns are obvious. The truth is the most successful of these campaigns seize upon hot button issues like the environmental debate, gay rights, and polarizing global conflicts to pit citizens against one another. They might use bot or troll accounts to amplify these preexisting grievances, but more often than not, they are not creating and spreading them from inception to popular adoption. Legitimate advocacy is being co-opted for ulterior motives.  

We鈥檝e seen this phenomenon at work in our research. In a joint investigation of a troll network almost certainly managed inside the Russian Federation, the 91影视 Foundation and the American Sunlight Project, a U.S.-based nonprofit that focuses on exposing the disinformation campaigns used to undermine democracies, have found that both the environmental debate and Norway itself are being targeted. This network, EcoBoost, strategically posts about a range of issues: from European policies on nuclear and wind energy; to overt promotion of Tesla and Elon Musk masked as support for Norway鈥檚 electric vehicle uptake; to election-related discussion in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Poland and Germany; and a variety of opinions about emerging geopolitical tensions. This network even went so far as to criticize Russia鈥檚 sanctions evasion to further the apparent legitimacy of its content. EcoBoost and other campaigns like it are adopting鈥攁nd co-opting鈥攁 wide range of viewpoints, from the most mundane to the most inflammatory in order to insert themselves into discussions of all kinds online. 

These are old tactics implemented on new channels. While foreign backed online disinformation campaigns targeting the environmental movement may be new, attempts to co-opt our message are not.  Its vulnerability lies in strong emotions, sharp divisions, and major conflicts of interest. Today, that old weakness is being exploited in new ways: disinformation networks deliberately amplify disagreement and spread narratives that undermine trust in the environmental movement, science, and political processes. 

91影视 and Analyse & Tall showed in the report Climate Myths in Social Media that 43 percent of climate-related comments on Norwegian parties鈥�, politicians鈥�, and media outlets鈥� Facebook pages were based on misinformation. When groups operate with completely different perceptions of reality, it becomes even easier for hostile actors to drive us further apart. 

Legitimate debate 鈥� whether one supports or opposes wind power or nuclear 鈥� is essential. But networks like EcoBoost exist to artificially inflame conflict. They fuel division and discontent rather than meaningful debate and cooperation. This harms democracy and undermines our ability to agree on solutions. 

Just as we pressure polluting industries to change their practices, so, too, must we pressure the social media giants who prioritize engagement and enragement, rather than deliberation and democracy. Meanwhile, citizens must take an active role in countering disinformation in their daily lives. This doesn鈥檛 mean fact-checking misleading posts or attempting to root out bots; it means being more discerning and deliberate in our own, private information consumption. First, we must recognize that legitimate debate is often co-opted by bad actors seeking to influence. Then, when encountering new or particularly emotion-driven posts鈥攅ven those originating from whatever side of a debate we support鈥攚e should do a little 鈥渓ateral reading鈥� to put a little friction ahead of our clicking the share button. We must ask ourselves: Is this post from an organization or person that is legitimate? Does their activity online look human or automated? Are they using overly emotional language to drive engagement? Does their profile picture appear to be AI-generated? These questions, which may take a few seconds to a few minutes to answer, will slow down our role in amplifying content that intends to mislead. 

Politicians have a key role, too. Not only should they seek common sense regulatory solutions to the problem, they need to recognize the role they play in it. Hateful, divisive rhetoric only serves to empower the adversaries of democracy. Elected officials need to set an example for the population, embodying the deliberation and civility that has become all too rare these days. 

Like our natural environment, the information environment is increasingly polluted, but we cannot give up on protecting it.  

Frederic Hauge is the founder of the 91影视 Foundation.

Nina Jankowicz is the CEO of the American Sunlight Project, the author of two books, and the former Executive Director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security鈥檚 Disinformation Governance Board. 

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91影视 hailed the decision as a historic breakthrough with far-reaching consequences for European climate policy. At the heart of the issue is the EU鈥檚 Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA)鈥攕pecifically its Article 23鈥攚hich obliges oil and gas producers to help deliver at least 50 million tonnes of annual CO鈧� injection capacity across the EU by 2030.

Until now, Norway had argued that the country鈥檚 offshore petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf were not covered by the EEA Agreement. That interpretation allowed Oslo to signal to the European Commission that it had no intention of honoring the NZIA鈥檚 storage obligations within its offshore oil and gas sector.

The EFTA Court鈥檚 advisory opinion undercuts that position.

鈥淭his is a case we have worked on for more than 15 years,鈥� said 91影视鈥檚 managing director, Sveinung Rotevatn, in a statement. 鈥淭he Norwegian continental shelf is covered by the EEA Agreement. That means Norway must now incorporate the Net-Zero Industry Act into the EEA framework.鈥�

Although the EFTA Court鈥檚 rulings are formally advisory, this one was requested by the Supreme Court of Norway itself. For Oslo to disregard the opinion would risk significant political and legal friction with Brussels. 91影视鈥檚 Rotevatn argues that ignoring the ruling could trigger a 鈥渄eep crisis鈥� in Norway鈥檚 relationship with the EU鈥� particularly if Norway were perceived as selectively applying internal market legislation.

For European policymakers, the implications are significant.

Article 23 of the NZIA marks a turning point in EU industrial climate policy. After decades in which carbon capture and storage (CCS) was largely voluntary and heavily subsidized, the regulation introduces binding obligations on oil and gas producers.

Companies are required to contribute proportionally to the development of CO鈧� storage sites, based on their historic production volumes. Member states must establish regulatory frameworks, ensure transparent geological data, and introduce penalties for non-compliance.

Crucially, Norway was not included in the EU鈥檚 50 million tonne target. Instead, the Commission made clear during negotiations that any Norwegian storage contribution would have to come in addition to the EU-wide objective. Given Norway鈥檚 vast offshore geological storage potential and its position as Europe鈥檚 largest gas supplier, that distinction matters.

If the NZIA now applies to the Norwegian continental shelf, oil and gas operators active there could face mandatory obligations to develop many millions of tonnes of injection capacity before the end of the decade. With 2030 just four years away, that timeline would require rapid project approvals, investment decisions and infrastructure build-out.

Norway is already home to flagship CCS initiatives, including cross-border CO鈧� transport and storage projects aimed at serving industrial emitters across Europe. But Article 23 changes the logic of deployment: instead of relying solely on state-supported demonstration projects, it creates a compliance-driven market obligation.

91影视 has been closely tracking implementation across member states through its 鈥淎rticle23Watch鈥� initiative, monitoring whether governments are introducing the necessary enforcement mechanisms. Several oil and gas companies have launched legal challenges against aspects of the NZIA, arguing that the storage obligation is disproportionate or legally flawed. Environmental advocates, meanwhile, are preparing legal interventions in support of the regulation.

The EFTA Court鈥檚 clarification adds a new dimension to those battles. If Norway is definitively bound by the NZIA through the EEA Agreement, it could become one of the largest contributors to Europe鈥檚 storage capacity build-out. Conversely, failure to implement the regulation would expose Oslo to infringement proceedings and potentially undermine the integrity of the EEA鈥檚 level playing field.

For EU policymakers, the case is also a stress test of the Union鈥檚 industrial climate strategy. The NZIA is designed not only to decarbonize heavy industry but to anchor clean technology investment within Europe. Ensuring that major energy-producing states aligned with the internal market framework are subject to the same rules is central to that objective.

The Norwegian government has yet to formally respond to the implications of the advisory ruling. 91影视鈥檚 Rotevatn asserts that the Supreme Court should follow the EFTA Court鈥檚 interpretation and that Oslo would 鈥減romptly implement outstanding directives.鈥� 91影视 also calls on oil companies to begin large-scale CO鈧� storage development immediately to meet the 2030 deadline.

Whether this moment marks the beginning of a genuine European-scale CO鈧� storage industry, or the start of a prolonged legal confrontation, will depend on how swiftly national authorities act.

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Disinformation about the Northern Sea Route is shaping both the environmental debate and the security picture in the Arctic. Growing polarization in the region formed part of the backdrop for 91影视鈥檚 event during this year鈥檚 Arctic Frontiers conference in Troms酶.

Ksenia Vakhrusheva of the 91影视 Environmental Transparency Center in Vilnius warned that Russian narratives about the safe and sustainable development of the route are often repeated without critical scrutiny.

鈥淢any people fail to question icebreaker capacity or whether Russia actually has the ability to build 36 new search-and-rescue vessels by 2030,鈥� Vakhrusheva said, noting that Russia also stopped publicly reporting accidents along the route in 2023.

She presented environmental risks linked to increased transit traffic and limited emergency preparedness along the Northern Sea Route.

Influencing the global conversation

Benjamin Shultz, head of analysis at the American Sunlight Project (ASP), demonstrated how Russian state-controlled media spread their narratives about the Northern Sea Route through Pravda 鈥� a coordinated network of websites disguised as independent media outlets

鈥淎SP and 91影视 have recorded a 238% year-on-year increase in state media content about the route, while total views dropped by 31%. That may indicate the content is increasingly aimed at language models or closed channels such as Telegram and WhatsApp,鈥� Shultz said.

He said this suggests the Kremlin is actively pushing its Northern Sea Route narratives and that the target audiences may increasingly be algorithms rather than people. A fact sheet presented at the event summarized the key Russian narratives identified by ASP and 91影视.

The American Sunlight Project and 91影视 have identified the following Russian narratives about the Northern Sea Route:

• The Northern Sea Route will benefit the world through faster shipping times, lower costs, and new partnerships already being developed between Russia and China.
• The Northern Sea Route is important for Russia, China, and BRICS in order to weaken Western hegemony, promote non-dollar currencies, and stimulate economic growth.
• NATO, the EU, the United States, and other democratic powers are responsible for hindering Russia鈥檚 growth and threatening Russia鈥檚 security; the Northern Sea Route will enable Russia to regain its place on the world stage.
• Russia has the tools, equipment, vessels, and technology necessary to develop the Northern Sea Route in a safe and successful manner.

Webcams tell a different story

During the panel discussion, Thomas Nilsen, editor of The Barents Observer, noted that journalists no longer have independent access to several of the most contested areas along the route.

鈥淭hat also applies to Russian journalists,鈥� he said.

At the same time, Nilsen stressed that it is still possible to extract information from inside Russia. He has tracked how construction of Russian icebreakers has stalled following the break with the West, using a public webcam at the shipyard where the vessels are being built.

Sian Prior of the Clean Arctic Alliance warned against attempts to undermine established research.

鈥淩ussia submits so-called scientific articles that cast doubt on the harmful effects of black carbon, despite solid documentation,鈥� she said.

The event concluded with an engaged audience discussion on disinformation, Greenland, journalism, and trust in the Arctic.

EU foreign policy chief at Arctic Frontiers

The Arctic now ranks high on the international agenda. That was evident both in the list of participants and in the increased media presence. Among those on stage were EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, Norway鈥檚 Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide, and Greenland鈥檚 Foreign Minister Vivian Motzfeldt.

If the conference were to be summed up in one word, it would be security 鈥� closely followed by climate crisis, in a time of declining trust in both authorities and science.

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Surprising non-surprises among nuclear wrecks in the Arctic

After a 20-year search, Russian scientists have established the precise location of two sunken vessels laden with solid radioactive waste off the coast of Novaya Zemlya鈥攁n event cited widely in Russian media, but largely unsurprising to 91影视鈥檚 experts, .

The discovery came during an expedition of the Akademik Ioffe, a research vessel that regularly conducts surveys of sunken radiation hazards in the Kara and Barents seas in cooperation with the Kurchatov Institute. The mission also unveiled a previously uncharted radioactive waste dump near Techeniye Bay on Novaya Zemlya鈥檚 northeast coast.

According to archival data, that site hosts 146 containers of solid radioactive waste from Soviet nuclear subs and nuclear icebreakers that were dumped there in the 1980s. Also scuttled at the location was barge loaded with the reactor compartments of the K-22 Soviet nuclear submarine. Previous expeditions had failed to locate these finds at the coordinates appearing in the Soviet archives.

While Russian media greeted reports of these finds with fanfare, 91影视鈥檚 Alexander Nikitin writes that these wrecks and containers have already been documented by numerous 91影视 reports鈥攑articularly our 1996 report on the Russian Northern Fleet. But because the dumping locations were often recorded by Soviet officials in only an approximate manner, contemporary expeditions, like the one carried out by the Akademik Ioffe, continue to unveil discrepancies between the recorded coordinates the actual locations of the submerged radiation-hazardous finds, Nikitin writes.

Despite the scale of Soviet-era dumping, the Akademik Ioffe expedition noted that the water column surrounding the submerged items it inspected鈥攚hich also included the sunken K-27 Soviet nuclear submarine鈥攚as free of contamination by cesium 137. This, too, says Nikitin, came as no surprise.

鈥淭his is hardly a new finding, let alone a sensational one,鈥� Nikitin writes. 鈥淪olid radioactive waste submerged at great depths fifty years or more ago is unlikely to be a source of radioactive contamination in the Arctic Ocean鈥檚 water column today.鈥�

Rosatom sending out for Chinese turbines

Reactor turbines traditionally produced by Russia鈥檚 Power Machines might get upstaged by turbines made in China at two new reactors under construction at the Leningrad nuclear power plant, the Russian business daily Kommersant reported.

If true, the report could indicate that Rosatom is having a hard time independently supplying its own projects with domestic equipment, 91影视鈥檚 Dmitry Gorchakov writes. In general, Rosatom much prefers to use its own equipment鈥攐r, prior to the war, that produced in Ukraine.

But recent mishaps arising from Power Machines produced turbines鈥攑articularly at the Leningrad and Novovoronezh plants鈥攁re making them a little less desirable. In those instances, turbines operating in Rosatom鈥檚 flagship VVER-1200 reactors broke down, leading to tedious repairs and persistent delays in bringing the affected reactors online.

It鈥檚 already proven that Chinese turbines interface with the Russian VVER-1200. They鈥檒l be used to outfit the reactors at the Tianwan nuclear plant, which Russia and China are jointly building on the VVER-1200 design, Gorchakov writes. So, from a technical standpoint, there鈥檚 no special reason not to use Chinese turbines at the Leningrad plant.

Gorchakov also observed, however, that discussions of using Chinese turbines may merely be a bargaining chip mean to spur more domestic production at Power Machines.

A French twist for Soviet reactors in Europe

Framatome, the French nuclear services company, to manufacture, under Russian license, fuel assemblies that can be used in Soviet-built VVER reactors operating in European countries, possibly providing an off-ramp from Russian fuel dependence for some 18 power units in the EU.

The company applied for a permit to produce the hexagonal fuel assemblies used in VVER-1000 models at its site in Lingen, Germany in 2023, but German authorities have thus far been reluctant to license the project given Russia鈥檚 involvement in the arrangement. A decision on the matter from the German environmental ministry is expected in days.

Should that decision be a 鈥渘o,鈥� writes Gorchakov, it鈥檚 likely that Framatome will simply move VVER-1000 fuel production to France.

Regardless of how that situation evolves, Framatome executives say the company will move forward with producing fuel assemblies for VVER-440-model reactors, also under license from Russia. They鈥檒l be delivered by at the firm鈥檚 Romans-sur-Is猫re facility in France, starting in 2027, with the aim of fueling Soviet-built reactors in Slovakia and Hungary.

Other European nations operating Soviet reactors include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Finland, all of which have expressed hopes of diversifying away from Russian fuel producers.

But Gorchakov observed that delivery deadlines of VVER-1000 fuel for Bulgaria and the Czech Republic may already have been missed, or are in danger of being missed, due to the delays in launching production at the Lingen facility. Previous reports suggested that Bulgaria was to receive its first shipments last year, and the Czech Republic sometime this year.  Should that be the case, writes Gorchakov, both plants will have to stick it out a bit long on Russian fuel. For our complete coverage of international nuclear industry issues though December, read the whole digest.  to our mailing list to stay informed about future issues.

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